





First draft: February 2002
This draft: December 30, 2002
Duke/UNC Micro-Theory Working Paper #13
Abstract
Within the heterogeneous independent private values model, we analyze
bidder collusion at ﬁrst and second price single-object auctions, allowing for
within-cartel transfers. Our primary focus is on (i) coalitions that contain a
strict subset of all bidders and (ii) collusive mechanisms that do not rely on in-
formation from the auctioneer, such as the identity of the winner or the amount
paid. To analyze collusion, a richer environment is required than that required
to analyze non-cooperative behavior. We must account for the possibility of
shill bidders as well as mechanism payment rules that may depend on the re-
ports of cartel members or their bids at the auction. We show there are cases in
which a coalition at a ﬁrst price auction can produce no gain for the coalition
members beyond what is attainable from non-cooperative play. In contrast,
a coalition at a second price auction captures the entire collusive gain. For
collusion to be eﬀective at a ﬁrst price auction we show that the coalition must
submit two bids that are diﬀerent but close to one another, a ﬁnding that has
important empirical implications.
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Auctions are a prevalent mechanism of exchange.1 It is natural for bidders to attempt
to suppress rivalry and thus capture some of the rents that would be transferred to
the seller if their bidding were non-cooperative. Case law is replete with examples of
Section 1 violations of the Sherman Act for bid rigging–and these cases are just the
bidders who were apprehended. For many bidders, a potential Section 1 violation is
just the cost of doing business. As a casual observation, whenever new auction mech-
anisms are proposed or designed, there seems to be remarkably little attention paid
to the issue of bidder collusion. Yet, in terms of foregone revenue, bidder collusion is
probably the most serious practical threat to revenue.
Within the heterogeneous independent private values model, we analyze bidder
collusion at ﬁrst and second price single-object auctions, allowing for within-cartel
transfers. Our primary interest is in coalitions that contain a strict subset of the
bidders. We focus attention on “pre-auction mechanisms”–those in which the collu-
sive mechanism does not rely on any information from the auction itself, such as the
identity of the winner or the amount paid. To analyze collusion, we require a richer
environment, as compared to non-cooperative behavior, to account for shill bidders,2
as well as mechanism payment rules that may depend on the reports of cartel mem-
bers or their bids at the auction. We demonstrate that the auction format (ﬁrst price
versus second price) leads to dramatically diﬀerent results in terms of the viability
and proﬁtability of collusion.
One contribution of this paper is to specify elements of an auction/mechanism
environment that are critical to the study of collusion. Some of these elements are
entirely inconsequential for the study of non-cooperative behavior. For example, we
1So are procurements. Our results apply to procurements, but we refer to auctions throughout
the paper.
2In this paper, a shill bidder is an incentiveless perfect agent of another bidder. A shill provides
a way for a bidder to disguise the identity of a “second” bid. Of course, the bidding behavior of a
shill may lead to inferences that the bid was not that of a “true bidder”.
1show that at a ﬁrst price auction, if within-ring3 transfers only depend on the reports
ring members make to the collusive mechanism prior to the auction (and not on bids
the ring members or their shills submit), then a ring mechanism that asks all ring
members with less than the highest value to bid zero cannot produce a surplus in
excess of that obtainable via non-cooperative play. A natural response to this ﬁnding
is to think that the bids of ring members will be observable to those who run the ring
mechanism, and thus it should be possible to condition payments on that information.
Introducing the observability of the ring members’ bids does not aﬀect results for a
non-cooperative setting, but does have an important eﬀect on the proﬁtability of
collusion.
In addition to specifying whether a ring can observe the bids of ring members, in
order to study collusion we must also consider the use of shill bidders. If we think
of non-cooperative play within the independent private values model, it is diﬃcult
to imagine any role for a shill bidder, especially if the auctioneer is non-strategic.
However, in a collusive environment, ring members are asked to submit speciﬁcb i d s
at the auction, and they may have better alternative bids. Further, it may be the
case that the bids they (as opposed to their shills) submit are observable by those
who run the ring, who can penalize them for inappropriate bids. The ability of a
ring member to use a shill bidder relaxes the constraint imposed on him by the ring
regarding his behavior at the auction. When ring members can use shill bidders at
the auction, our results for second price auctions are unaﬀected, but collusive payoﬀs
are weakly reduced for ﬁrst price auctions.
We show that there are cases in which a coalition at a ﬁrst price auction can pro-
duce no gain for coalition members beyond what is attainable from non-cooperative
play. However, there are also cases in which collusion at a ﬁrst price auction may be
proﬁtable. In these cases, unless the mechanism can directly control ring bids, the
mechanism must be such that at least two ring bidders are sent to the auction by
3Bidder coalitions are often referred to as “rings” (see Cassady 1967, Chapter 13).
2the ring, where one is instructed to submit a bid that is just below the other. The
lower bid is required to prevent the high bidder from deviating to a lower bid–if such
a deviation were allowed to occur, it would result in violation of an incentive com-
patibility constraint. This result has potentially important empirical implications.
Speciﬁcally, if we frequently observe two sequential bids within one bid increment
of each other, such as that the highest losing bid being within one bid increment of
the winning bid (as opposed to being tied), and if there is no obvious market-based
reason for such bids, then these bids are suggestive of collusive bidding.
With regard to the comparison between ﬁrst price and second price auctions with
respect to bidder collusion, there has been some intuition oﬀered for years that goes
as follows. At a second price auction, a bidder cartel must suppress the bids of all
members except the bidder with highest value. The cartel bidder with highest value
goes to the auction and bids as he would were he acting non-cooperatively. Any
cartel member who thinks of breaking ranks and competing at the auction faces the
highest cartel bidder and the highest non-cartel bidder, each submitting bids that are
the same as if all were acting non-cooperatively. Thus, there is no gain to deviant
behavior. The ﬁrst price auction is quite diﬀerent. In order to secure a collusive
gain the ring member with the highest value must lower his bid below what he would
have bid acting non-cooperatively, and other ring members must suppress their bids.
But when the highest-valuing ring member lowers his bid, the non-coalition bidders
optimally lower theirs in response, and the opportunity is created for a non-highest-
valuing coalition member to enter an aggressive bid at the auction, either on his own
or through a shill, and secure an item that he may not have been able to win acting
non-cooperatively. This possibility jeopardizes the feasibility of a coalition at a ﬁrst
price auction.
In addition, the optimal reduction in bids by non-cartel bidders implies that some
of the collusive gain “leaks out” to them. This inability of the cartel to keep all of the
collusive gain, which the cartel can do at a second price auction, further jeopardizes
3the feasibility of the ring at a ﬁrst price auction.
I nt h i sp a p e rw ep r o v i d es c e n a r i o si nw h i c ht h ea b o v ei n t u i t i o n sa r eb o r n eo u t .
The paper proceeds as follows. The literature review is in Section 2, the model is
in Section 3, and the results are in Section 4. A discussion of the results is in Section
5. The case of the all-inclusive coalition is in an appendix, as are the proofs for the
results in the main text.
2 Literature review
Perhaps the starting point for auction theory is the work of Vickrey (1961, 1962).
Three papers in the early 1980’s–Riley and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981), and
Milgrom and Weber (1982)–resolve major conundrums and provide benchmark re-
sults from which much progress has been made in the ensuing two decades. One
m o d e l i n gf r a m e w o r kt h a th a sr e c e i v e dm u c ha t t e n t i o ni nt h ea u c t i o nl i t e r a t u r ei s
called the “independent private values” model (IPV) where it is assumed that bid-
ders independently draw values from the same distribution F and that each bidder
knows his value but not the value of any other bidder (values are private information).4
The central result within the IPV framework is the revenue equivalence theorem–a
broad class of auction mechanisms, including those most commonly used in practice,
p r o d u c ei d e n t i c a lr e v e n u ef o rt h es e l l e rw hen bidders are risk neutral and act non-
cooperatively. Much ensuing research in auction theory addresses the relaxation of
the underlying modeling assumptions to determine the impact on expected revenue
for diﬀerent auction schemes. For example, when bidders are risk averse, the ﬁrst
price auction outperforms the second price auction (Matthews 1983, 1987). One vein
4We refer to this particular variant of the IPV model as “symmetric IPV” or simply “IPV”. In
Myerson, the IPV framework allows for the possibility that bidders independently draw private values
from diﬀerent distributions, Fi. We refer to this generalization of the IPV model as “heterogeneous
IPV” or “asymmetric IPV”. We focus on a variant of the heterogeneous IPV model that requires
all value distributions to have the same lower and upper support.
4of work in this regard focuses on the relaxation of the non-cooperative assumption.5
Within an IPV, single-object framework, Graham and Marshall (GM, 1987) pro-
vide a proﬁtable mechanism for a coalition of any size at a second price or English
auction.6 In their framework, k of n bidders are in the ring where k ≤ n. Prior to
the auction the k ring members each receive a ﬁx e de xa n t en o n - c o n t i n g e n tp a y m e n t
from a “center”.7 Each ring member makes a report ri to the center. The center
recommends that the k − 1 ring members with lowest reports bid below the reserve
p r i c ea tt h ea u c t i o n , 8 while the ring member with highest report bids up to his report
at the auction. If the ring member wins the auction, he pays the center nothing
if the auction price is greater than the second-highest report from the ring. If the
second-highest ring report exceeds the price paid at the auction then the winning ring
bidder pays the center the diﬀerence between the second-highest report and the price
at the auction. The ex ante expectation of this payment to the center, divided by k,
is the ﬁxed ex ante non-contingent payment made by the center to each ring member
(thus the mechanism is ex ante balanced budget). GM show that this mechanism
is incentive compatible (ring members report truthfully to the center and follow her
recommendations). Also, each bidder wants to join the coalition and each ring mem-
ber wants a potential new member to join. The mechanism is eﬃcient in that the
5For repeated auctions, collusion by an all-inclusive ring can be sustained in some environments.
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) prove a folk theorem for the case in which bidders can
communicate prior to each auction and can observe each others’ bids but cannot make transfers.
They show that as the discount factor increases to one, the optimal collusive scheme is eﬃcient. Even
without communication or the ability to observe bids, Blume and Heidhues (2001) and Skrzypacz
and Hopenhayn (2001) show that for discount factors suﬃciently large, the ring can do better than
noncooperative play or a bid rotation scheme by using implicit transfers of equilibrium continuation
payoﬀs, although eﬃciency cannot be achieved.
6For heterogeneous IPV bidders at a second price auction, Mailath and Zemsky (1991) ﬁnd an
optimal mechanism. Graham, Marshall, and Richard (1990) show that a side payment scheme that
is commonly employed by practicing rings when its members are heterogeneous allocates each ring
member his Shapley value.
7The notion of a center, an incentiveless agent who facilitates implementation of the mechanism,
was introduced by Myerson (1983).
8In a later section of the paper, Graham and Marshall describe optimal “disguised” bids by the
k−1 lowest-valuing ring members. These meaningless “competitive” bids are submitted by the ring
so that the auctioneer cannot infer whether bids are coming from a ring or non-ring bidder.
5winner is always the bidder with the highest value. Finally, there is no alternative
mechanism that all ring members would prefer. A critical implicit assumption of GM
is that the designated ring bidder cannot circumvent payment to the center when,
both, he wins and the second-highest report is greater than the price paid at the
auction.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) provide an analysis of collusion within an IPV frame-
work for a ﬁrst price auction, where emphasis is on the surplus division game for an
all-inclusive cartel. When the cartel members cannot make internal transfers (weak
cartel), McAfee and McMillan show that the outcome of the auction is potentially
ineﬃcient in that a cartel member is selected at random (from those willing to pay in
excess of the reserve price) to be the sole bidder at the auction. When side payments
are possible (strong cartel), then the members conduct an ex ante ﬁrst price auction,
where the winning bid is equally distributed to all losers and the winner is the sole
bidder at the main auction.9 Strong cartels produce eﬃcient allocations, provided
the highest value exceeds the reserve price.10 With regard to individual rational-
ity constraints, McAfee and McMillan oﬀer some characterizations, but because of
the analytic intractability that emerges from the heterogeneity implied by collusion
within an IPV model, results are only provided for a special discrete case.
The existence of equilibrium in a heterogeneous IPV setting has been demon-
strated by a number of authors, including Athey (2001), Maskin and Riley (2000b),
and Lebrun (1996).11 Bidding behavior and expected revenue within an asymmetric
I P Vf r a m e w o r kh a sb e e na n a l y z e db yM a s k i na n dR i l e y( 2 0 0 0 a ) . 12 Ar e m a r k a b l e
9Lyk-Jensen (1997a) shows there exist several eﬃcient, ex post budget balanced, pre-auction
mechanisms for an all-inclusive ring.
10Relaxing the IPV assumption, Lyk-Jensen (1996) shows that an all-inclusive ring can sustain
collusion using the second price pre-auction knock-out of Graham and Marshall (1987) or the ﬁrst
price pre-auction knock-out and McAfee and McMillan (1992) in the general symmetric model with
aﬃliated values (see Milgrom and Weber (1982)). In this case, eﬃciency is not achieved with a ﬁrst
or second price pre-auction knock-out, but can be achieved with a pre-auction knock-out that allows
information sharing and is ex ante budget balanced (Lyk-Jensen (1996)) or ex post budget balanced
(Lyk-Jensen (1997b)).
11The comprehensive contribution of Athey (2001) covers heterogeneous IPV as a special case.
12The working paper circulated for nearly a decade prior to publication and thus inﬂuenced work
6non-result emerges from this work–it is extremely diﬃcult to provide any meaning-
ful general analytic characterization as to the conditions under which one auction
scheme will outperform another in terms of expected revenue.
Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and Stromquist (MMRS, 1994) provide numerical
methods for obtaining solutions to the diﬀerential equations that implicitly deﬁne
bids when k of n IPV bidders (k ≤ n) collude and the remaining bidders act non-
cooperatively (a speciﬁc kind of asymmetric IPV). Because of numerical instabilities
at the origin the solutions involve “backward shooting” methods. The appendix of
their paper provides an exact analytic solution for the terminal point of the bid
functions for a special case. Unfortunately, for most situations the terminal condition
must also be numerically obtained.
Maskin and Riley (1996a), Bajari (1997, 2001), and Lebrun (1999) analyze a het-
erogeneous IPV model in which each bidder’s distribution has common lower and
upper support and shows that there is a unique equilibrium.13 This implies that the
bid functions in MMRS are unique. Further, Bajari (2001) implies that whatever
mechanism is used by a cartel at a ﬁrst price auction, if the designated cartel bidders
and non-cartel bidders arrive at the auction with values consistent with a heteroge-
neous IPV model, then the equilibrium is unique. This result will be used in this
paper.
3M o d e l
We ﬁrst provide the ingredients of the heterogeneous IPV model and restate known
results. We then discuss the additional structure needed to analyze collusion within
this framework. Compared to non-cooperative behavior, a ring member has a richer
set of questions to confront. Can he increase his expected payoﬀ by misrepresenting
his report to the center? Can he increase his expected payoﬀ by deviating from the
published much earlier.
13For results regarding non-common supports see Lebrun (2002).
7ring’s recommended bid, perhaps to take advantage of suppressed ring bids to win
an item that he would not win if he followed the center’s recommendation? Can he
proﬁtably make use of a shill bidder?
3.1 Heterogeneous IPV model14
We consider a single object auction within a heterogeneous IPV framework with a
non-strategic seller.15 In the case of a tie, we assume the object is randomly allocated
to one of the bidders with the high bid. There are n risk neutral bidders where bidder
i independently draws a value vi from a distribution Fi.
Assumption 1 For all i, Fi(vi) has support [v, ¯ v],w h e r ev ≥ 0. The probability
density function fi(vi) is continuously diﬀerentiable and, for all i, fi(vi) is bounded
away from zero on [v, ¯ v].16
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, an equilibrium at a ﬁrst price auction exists in pure
strategies, the bid function is strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable, and the equilibrium
is unique.17
Furthermore, the unique equilibrium bid functions have the feature that a bidder
with value v chooses a bid equal to v, and so (regardless of the reserve price) no
bidder chooses a bid less than v (see, e.g., Lebrun (1999)).
14The initial model characterization in this section borrows from Bajari (2001), with straightfor-
ward conversions from costs to values.
15Although we assume the seller is non-strategic, i.e., does not set a reserve price greater than the
lower support of the bidders’ value distributions in order to extract additional surplus from bidders,
the lower support is common knowledge, so we treat it as a binding reserve price.
16An alternative assumption generating Lemma 1 can be found in Lebrun (2002). For all i, Fi
has support [v, ¯ v],w h e r ev ≥ 0 and is diﬀerentiable over (v, ¯ v] with a derivative fi locally bounded
away from zero over this interval, and there exists δ>0 such that Fi is strictly log-concave over
(v,v+ δ). The function fi is locally bounded away from zero if for all v in (v, ¯ v],t h e r ee x i s t s >0
such that fi(w) > 0, for all w in (v − ε, v + ε).
17See citations in Section 2.
83.2 General features of a collusive mechanism
We are interested in the existence of collusive mechanisms that generate an expected
surplus for each ring member that strictly exceeds the expected surplus each ring
member could attain acting non-cooperatively. For the remainder of the paper this is
what we mean by “proﬁtable collusion”. In particular, we are interested in the case
in which there are n ≥ 3 bidders, and k of those bidders are eligible to participate
in a ring, where 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 (see Appendix A for results for an all-inclusive ring,
i.e., k = n). We use indices 1,...,k to denote ring members and k +1,...,n to denote
outside bidders.
The game is as follows: First, a ring mechanism is announced (there is credible
commitment to the mechanism). Both potential ring members and outside bidders
observe the announcement. Second, ring members decide whether to join. All bidders
observe whether all potential ring members join or not. Third, if not all potential
ring members join, then the ring mechanism does not operate and all bidders submit
their bids. If all potential ring members join, then ring members participate in the
mechanism and all bidders submit their bids.
When a potential ring member decides whether to join the ring, we assume he
joins if and only if his ex ante (before learning his own value) expected payoﬀ from
participation in the mechanism is greater than or equal to his ex ante (before learn-
ing his own value) expected payoﬀ from non-cooperative play.18 One can view this
assumption as assuming that potential ring members must decide whether to join the
18There are two features of ring membership. One is individual rationality–does a given bidder
want to participate in the ring? The other is whether a set of k − 1 ring members want to include
the kth bidder as a ring member. This latter issue raises the question whether it might be necessary
to provide diﬀerent ex ante non-contingent payments to the diﬀerent ring members, reﬂecting their
diﬀerent marginal values to the ring. This consideration does not aﬀect our results. It is not
relevant for our negative results for ﬁrst price auctions because the failure of the ring is not due to
membership considerations. It is not relevant for our positive results for ﬁrst price auctions because
they assume symmetry, and so equal ex ante non-contingent payments are appropriate. For second
price auctions, membership issues are potentially a concern, but Graham, Marshall, and Richard
(1990, Theorem 7) show how to construct the ex ante non-contingent payments to deal with this
concern.
9ring before they learn their values, or one can assume that potential ring members
decide after they learn their values but that the auction is the stage game for an
inﬁnitely repeated game in which values are independently drawn at the beginning
of each period.19 In Section 4.3 (and Appendix A), we consider the more restric-
tive assumption of interim individual rationality, under which a ring member decides
whether to participate in the ring after learning his value.
If one or more potential ring members chooses not to join the ring, the ring does
not operate, and all bidders participate in the auction non-cooperatively.20 If all the
potential ring members decide to join the ring, then a “center”, the standard Myerson
(1983) incentiveless mechanism agent,21 makes payments to all ring members (could
be zero to all).22 Then each ring member makes a report to the center. Based on
these reports the center recommends a bid to be made by each ring member and
requires payments from the ring members. In a bid coordination mechanism, the
center bases required payments only on the reports of the ring members.23 In a bid
submission mechanism, the center bases required payments on both the reports of the
ring members and their bids at the auction. Thus, in a bid submission mechanism,
the center can require a very large payment from a bidder who does not bid according
to the center’s recommendation, guaranteeing that it is a best reply for ring members
to follow the center’s recommendation.24 Ring members then decide on what action
to take at the auction, which may include the use of shill bidders to bid on their
19In this case, for discount factors suﬃciently close to one, the participation strategy is supported
by Nash reversion to non-cooperative play. To see this, note that bidder i’s one-shot gain is bounded
above by ¯ v (more precisely i’s expected one-shot gain is bounded above by the non-cooperative
surplus of a bidder with value ¯ v), so if the expected stage-game payoﬀ is positive for each player,
then for discount factors suﬃciently close to one, it is alway individually rational for potential ring
members to join the ring.
20This is a common, but not innocent, simplifying assumption in the auction literature.
21The center in this paper is also a banker when ex ante budget balance is required.
22Given that bidders are ex ante heterogeneous, the ex ante non-contingent payments could be
diﬀerent.
23At auctions of precious gems, it is sometimes the case that neither the identity of the winner
nor the bids submitted by speciﬁc bidders are publicly revealed, although the winning price is
announced. In this case, the payments to the center can only be a function of the initial ring reports
(and perhaps the announced winning price).
24One interpretation of this is that the center actually submits a bid on behalf of each ring member.
10behalf.25 Incentive compatibility involves (i) making honest reports to the center, (ii)
following the center’s recommendation regarding the bid to submit at the auction,
and (iii) not using a shill to submit a bid. We require that the center’s budget be
balanced in expectation.
Thus, an incentive compatible mechanism is µ =( x1,...,xk,β1,...,βk,p 1,...,pk),
where for all i ∈ {1,...,k},x i is ring member i’s non-contingent payment from the
center, βi(r1,...,rk) is his recommended bid as a function of the ring members’ reports,
and pi(r1,...,rk) is his required payment to the center in a bid coordination mechanism
and pi(r1,...,rk;b1,...,bk) is his required payment in a bid submission mechanism,
where bi is ring member i’s bid. The mechanism must satisfy incentive compatibility
for reports, incentive compatibility for bidding, incentive compatibility for not using
a shill,26 budget balance, and ex ante individual rationality. To be precise, we now
write the deﬁnition of an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst
price auction in detail; the deﬁnitions for second price auctions and for bid submission
mechanisms are similar. To state the deﬁnition, we use the convention that vk denotes
the vector of values for the ring members, i.e., vk =( v1,...,vk),v k
−i denotes the values
of ring members other than i, v−i denotes the values of all bidders other than i,a n d
β
nc
i denotes player i’s noncooperative bid function for a ﬁrst price auction.
Deﬁnition 1 For a ﬁrst price auction, an incentive compatible bid coordination
mechanism is µ =( x1,...,xk,β1,...,βk,p 1,...,p k), where for all i ∈ {1,...,k},x i ∈ R
and βi : Rk → (−∞, ¯ v] and pi : Rk → R are measurable, satisfying:
25It seems unrealistic that a defense contractor for a major project could use a shill bidder.
However, it seems quite possible at an antique auction.
26For a bid coordination mechanism, incentive compatibility for not using a shill (#3 in the
deﬁnition) is implied by incentive compatibility for bidding (#2 in the deﬁnition), but for a bid
submission mechanism, a ring member’s required payment depends on his bid, and so incentive
compatibility for bidding no longer implies incentive compatibility for not using a shill. Thus, the
constraint that a ring member not use a shill can bind in a bid submission mechanism.
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To deﬁne an incentive compatible bid submission mechanism,m o d i f yt h ea b o v e
deﬁnition to allow the payment required from ring member i, pi,t od e p e n do nt h e
vector of reports and on the ring members’ bids at the auction, and modify the
information Ii available to ring member i so that ring member i is told what his
payment would be as a function of his bid assuming all other ring members bid
12according to their recommended bids.27 One can show that it is suﬃcient to allow pi
to depend on the vector of reports and on only ring member i’s bid at the auction.
This holds because in equilibrium ring member i’s information and expected payoﬀ
depends only on the other ring members’ recommended bids and not on their actual
bids. Thus, in a bid submission mechanism, one can envision a bidding machine
that enters bids for the ring members as a function of their reports, preventing the
possibility of deviations from the center’s recommended bids. Alternatively, the center
might prevent ring members whose recommended bids are not highest from attending
the auction. Or, each ring member might post a performance bond that is forfeited
if any bid appears at the auction under his name that is diﬀerent from the center’s
recommendation.
We say a collusive mechanism is ex post eﬃcient if the highest-valuing bidder,
w h e t h e rar i n gm e m b e ro ro u t s i d eb i d d e r ,a l w a y sw i n st h eo b j e c t . W en o wd e ﬁne
what it means for the ring to capture the entire collusive gain. To state the result
formally, when the vector of bidders’ values is v and play is non-cooperative, let
Rnc(v) be the joint payoﬀ of the ring members, Onc
j (v) be the payoﬀ of outside bidder
j (j ∈ {k+1,...,n}), and Snc(v) be the auctioneer’s (seller’s) payoﬀ. Similarly, when
the vector of bidders’ values is v and bidders 1,...,k participate in collusive mechanism
µ,l e tRµ(v) be the joint payoﬀ of the ring members, O
µ
j (v) be the payoﬀ of outside
bidder j,a n dSµ(v) be the auctioneer’s payoﬀ.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that the ring captures the entire collusive gain under







j (v) ≤ (=)O
nc
j (v).





−i)) from his bid onto his required payment. Alternatively, our results
continue to hold if one assumes that a ring member learns the mapping from the actual bids of
all the ring members onto his required payment, pi(ri,vk
−i;·,...,·)). In this case the ring member
must take the expectation over the bids of the other ring members, which in equilibrium are their
recommended bids.
13If a ring does not capture the entire collusive gain, then the presence of collusion
provides some beneﬁt, relative to non-cooperative play, to parties outside the ring,
either the outside bidders or the auctioneer.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Bid coordination mechanisms
We begin by considering mechanisms that result in the highest-valuing ring member’s
bidding at the auction, but that suppress the bids of the other ring members, for
example by having non-highest-valuing ring members bid v or not bid at all. We
refer to mechanisms of this kind as mechanisms that suppress all ring competition.
A sw es h o w ,i nt h i sc a s et h e r ei sas t a r kd i ﬀerence between proﬁtability of collusion
at a second price versus a ﬁrst price auction. Proposition 1 shows that the ring
can capture the entire collusive gain if the auction is second price, but Proposition
2 shows that there is no proﬁtable collusive mechanism if the auction is ﬁrst price.
Thus, Propositions 1 and 2 formalize the intuition that the eﬀectiveness of collusion
can be reduced by using a ﬁrst price rather than a second price auction.
Proposition 1 There exists a proﬁtable, ex post eﬃcient bid coordination mech-
anism for a second price auction that suppresses all ring competition and allows the
ring to capture the entire collusive gain.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 There does not exist a proﬁtable bid coordination mechanism for
a ﬁrst price auction that suppresses all ring competition.
Proof. See the Appendix.
14Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a proﬁtable collusive mechanism under
weaker conditions that in the previous literature. For example, the mechanism of
Graham and Marshall (1987), which applies to second price auctions, relies on the
identity of the winner and the amount paid at the auction.
The proof of Proposition 1 is by construction. The collusive mechanism proposed
speciﬁes that the highest-reporting ring member pay the center an amount equal
to the expected surplus for a bidder with value equal to the second-highest report
from bidding at the auction against the outside bidders. For example, if bidders are
symmetric,28 the ring member with the highest report pays the center ˜ p(r2), where
r2 is the second-highest report and



















Ring members with lower reports pay nothing. The center recommends that the
bidder with the highest report bid his report at the auction and that all other ring
members bid v. In equilibrium, ring members truthfully report their values and fol-
low the recommendations of the center. Integrating over the possible second-highest




v ˜ p(x)k(k − 1)Fk−2(x)(1 − F(x))f(x)dx, which is positive and satisﬁes budget
balance for the center.
To see that interim individual rationality is satisﬁed (and therefore also ex ante
individual rationality), note that if a bidder i ∈ {1,...,k} with value v joins the ring,
he has expected payoﬀ equal to the ex ante non-contingent payment plus
˜ p(v) −
R v




where the ﬁrst term is the ring member’s expected payoﬀ from competing at the auc-
tion and the second term is the ring member’s expected payment to the center. Re-
28Proposition 1 also applies to asymmetric bidders, but for the purposes of the example, it is
useful to focus on the case of symmetric bidders.
15arranging (1) and integrating by parts, it can be shown to be equal to
R v
v Fn−1(x)dx,
which is the expected payoﬀ to a bidder with value v under non-cooperative play.
Thus, a potential ring member bidder strictly prefers to join the ring since he en-
joys a payoﬀ that exceeds his non-cooperative payoﬀ b yt h ea m o u n to ft h ee xa n t e
non-contingent payment.29
Proposition 1 establishes the proﬁtability of a bid coordination mechanism when
the auction is second price, and this implies that there is a similarly proﬁtable bid
submission mechanism.
Corollary 1 There exists a proﬁtable, ex post eﬃcient bid submission mechanism
for a second price auction that suppresses all ring competition and allows the ring to
capture the entire collusive gain.
As has been noted in the literature, the ability of ring members to use shills
to place bids on their behalf can aﬀect the proﬁtability of a collusive mechanism.30
But, because the incentive compatibility constraints for a bid coordination mechanism
imply that no ring member has an incentive to use a shill bidder to submit a bid at
the auction, Proposition 1 implies that a ring at a second price auction is unaﬀected
by the feasibility of shill bidding.
Corollary 2 The feasibility of shill bidding does not aﬀect the ring’s expected payoﬀ
in the second price mechanism of Proposition 1.
29For a numerical example, consider the case with n =3and k =2 , so there are two bidders in
the ring and one outside bidder, and assume values are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. In this case,
t h ee xa n t en o n - c o n t i n g e n tp a y m e n ti s 1
24. Let bidders 1 and 2 be the ring members, and let v1 ≥ v2.




2 to the center and
competes against bidder 3 at the auction. Bidder 1 expects payoﬀ
v3
1
3 from non-cooperative play if
he does not join the ring. If he does join the ring, he gets ex ante payment 1




to the center, and expects surplus
v3
1




3 ,w h i c hi s
greater than his non-cooperative expected payoﬀ by the amount of the ex ante payment.
30Some literature uses “shill bidding” to mean bids submitted by the auctioneer (or seller) under
the guise of being a regular bidder (see Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2001) and Hidvégi, Wang,
and Whinston (2001)). We assume a non-strategic auctioneer and use “shill bidding” to mean bids
submitted by ring members under a diﬀerent name, which cannot be traced to them.
16In contrast, when the auction is ﬁrst price, Proposition 2 shows that, when the
ring is restricted to use a payment rule that depends only on the reports to the
center, there is no proﬁtable collusive mechanism that suppresses the bids of all
but the highest-valuing ring member. Because the center cannot penalize deviations
from the recommended bids, in any proﬁtable collusive mechanism that suppresses
the bids of non-highest-valuing ring member, the highest-valuing ring member bids
optimally against the outside bidders implying that he bids strictly less than his
value (for all values above v) and that his bid does not depend on the values of the
other ring members. But then, with positive probability, there exists a ring member
who is supposed to suppress his bid but who can proﬁtably deviate by competing
at the auction against the highest-valuing ring member and the outside bidders, a
contradiction.
Because Proposition 2 focuses on mechanisms that suppress the bids of all but
the highest-valuing ring member, the result does not rule out the possibility that
t h e r ee x i s t ss o m eo t h e rk i n do fp r o ﬁtable bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price
auction; however, it does suggest that bid coordination mechanisms have limited
beneﬁt. In particular, the proposition implies that no bid coordination mechanism
can suppress all competition among the ring members. Since optimal non-cooperative
bids at a ﬁrst price auction depend on the number of bidders, one might think that
ar i n ga taﬁrst price auction could secure a collusive gain merely by suppressing the
bids of some of the ring members. However, as we now show, for symmetric bidders,
even if the ring could suppress competition among all ring members other than the
ﬁrst and second-highest-valuing ring members, that would not be suﬃcient to secure a
collusive gain. The proof relies on Assumption 1 and the uniqueness result of Lemma
1.31
Proposition 3 Assume bidders are symmetric. If a bid coordination mechanism
31A similar result holds for second price auctions if we restrict attention to the equilibrium in
weakly dominant strategies.
17at a ﬁrst price auction suppresses ring competition except for the ﬁrst and second-
highest-valuing ring members, but provides no information to these two ring members
other than that their values are either highest or second highest, then the unique
equilibrium of the auction subgame is for the two ring members and all outside bidders
to bid non-cooperatively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 further highlights the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a proﬁtable bid coordi-
nation mechanism. It says that as long as the two highest-valuing ring members
participate in the auction, each knowing only that they have one of the two highest
values, then the equilibrium of the auction subgame involves non-cooperative bidding.
So for there to be any gain relative to non-cooperative play, the ring must do more
than just reduce the number of bidders attending the auction by suppressing bids of
lower-valuing bidders.
At a second price auction, a ring can secure a collusive gain using a bid coordination
mechanism that merely manipulates the second-highest ring bid, but at a ﬁrst price
auction, a proﬁtable bid coordination mechanism must reduce the highest ring bid
and manipulate the second-highest ring bid. Thus, the task facing a ring is more
diﬃcult at a ﬁrst price auction than at a second price auction.
Propositions 2 and 3, identify outcomes that cannot be accomplished with a bid
coordination mechanism. We now characterize a proﬁtable bid coordination mecha-
nism for a ﬁrst price auction. Our characterization result has interesting empirical
implications. It says that a bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price auction must
sometimes require that ring members other than the highest-valuing ring member bid
at the auction. In particular, the mechanism must require that at least one other ring
member submit a bid that is close to the highest ring bid.
To see the intuition for this result, ﬁrst note that if the center recommends a
bid to a ring member that is less than that ring member’s optimal bid against the
18outside bidders (assuming no other ring bids), then that ring member can increase
his expected payoﬀ by deviating from the recommendation of the center as long as
the ring member’s information implies positive probability of winning the object at
the higher bid. Second, note that if the center always recommends that the highest-
valuing ring member bid optimally against the outside bidders and that all other
ring members bid something less, then for a positive-measure set of values, some
ring member has an incentive to submit a higher bid in an attempt to outbid the
highest-valuing ring member. Thus, the center must sometimes recommend a bid
greater than the optimal bid for the highest-valuing ring member against the outside
bidders. Third, in order for a bid above the highest-valuing ring member’s optimal
bid against the outside bidders to be incentive compatible, it must be that some
other ring member also bids above the optimal bid. Loosely, to prevent deviations
from non-highest-valuing ring members, the center must recommend that the highest-
valuing ring member bid suﬃciently high, but then to prevent deviations from that
ring member, the center must recommend that some other ring member submit a bid
just below his.
To formalize this result, let β
∗(v;bk+1,...,bn) be the optimal bid for a ring member
with value v if all other ring members submit bid v and the outside bidders bid






(v − b)1 b≥maxj∈{k+1,...,n} bj(vj)
´
.
We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 2 In any bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price auction, for all
b u taz e r o - m e a s u r es e to fr i n gm e m b e r s ’v a l u e s ,t h eh i g h e s tr i n gb i di sg r e a t e rt h a no r
equal to β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,bn), and strictly greater for a positive-measure set
32A ring member’s optimal bid against the outside bidders exists if the conjectured bid functions
for the outside bidders are continuous. If the optimal bid is not unique, then Lemma 2 continues to
hold if we deﬁne β
∗ to be the minimum of the optimal bids, and then Proposition 4 holds because
there can only be multiplicity of optimal bids for a zero measure set of value realizations.
19of ring members’ values, where bk+1,...,bn are the equilibrium bid functions (assumed
continuous) for the outside bidders.
Proof. See the Appendix.
L e m m a2s a y st h a ta n ybid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price auction (al-
most) always results in a ring bid that is at least as high as what the optimal bid
would be for the highest-valuing ring member bidding against the outside bidders,
and sometimes strictly greater.
Proposition 4 In any proﬁtable bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price auc-
tion, for a positive-measure set of value realizations, at least two ring members submit
bids at the auction that are greater than or equal to β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,bn),
where bk+1,...,bn, are the equilibrium bid functions (assumed continuous) for the out-
side bidders. Furthermore, for any ε>0, there is a positive-measure set of value
realizations such that the highest two ring bids are within ε of each other.
Proof. See the Appendix.33
Proposition 4 implies that when v∗ is the highest value in the ring, we should
expect to see multiple ring bids between β
∗(v∗;bk+1,...,bn) and v∗. Furthermore, it
follows from Proposition 4 that it must be the highest-valuing ring member who
submits one of the bids greater than or equal to β
∗(v∗;bk+1,...,bn).
Corollary 3 In any proﬁtable bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price auc-
tion, either the highest-valuing ring member bids β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,bn) and
all other ring members bid less, or the highest-valuing ring member and at least one
other ring member bid greater than or equal to β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,bn) and all
other ring members bid less.
33It is important to note that we do not know if an equilibrium exists when the ring submits two
bids. Lemma 1 may not apply.
20Proof. Using Proposition 4, if the highest-valuing ring member’s recommended bid is
less than β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,b n), then that ring member believes with prob-
ability one that his recommended bid is not highest in the ring and so has zero
probability of winning the auction. Because the ring member’s value is highest, he
must believe that a bid less than his value wins the auction with positive probability.
Thus, the ring member has a proﬁtable deviation. Q.E.D.
In environments with discrete bid increments, the empirical implications of Propo-
sition 4 are particularly interesting. Proposition 4 implies that the highest ring bid
must sometimes be strictly greater than β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,bn),b u tab i d
greater than β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,b n) is not optimal for any ring member unless
that ring member believes that reducing his bid by one bid increment would decrease
the probability with which he outbids the other ring members. Thus, a proﬁtable bid
coordination mechanism must sometimes require that one ring member submit a bid
that is within one bid increment of the highest ring bid.
Corollary 4 Assume a ﬁrst price auction with small, discrete bid increments. In
any bid coordination mechanism, for a positive-measure set of value realizations,
the two highest ring bids are within one bid increment of each other.
Corollary 4 says that the two highest ring bids will sometimes be within one bid
increment of each other. If the collusive mechanism never allows non-highest-valuing
ring members to win the object, then not only must the two highest ring bids be
within one bid increment, but they must never be tied.
As an illustration of how a bid coordination mechanism might work, consider a
mechanism that recommends that the highest-valuing ring member bid the maxi-
mum of β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;bk+1,...,bn) and the second-highest value in the ring. Fur-
thermore, suppose the mechanism recommends that the second-highest-valuing ring
member bid his value minus one bid increment, and that all other ring members bid
21some lower amount. Then, clearly, no ring member has an incentive deviate from the
center’s recommended bids. In such a mechanism, there may be a problem satisfying
incentive compatibility for reports to the center, but this can be overcome if the cen-
ter can observe the identity of the winner and penalize ring members who win but
who did not have the highest report.34
4.2 Leakage
One diﬃculty in proving general results about the proﬁtability of collusion at ﬁrst
p r i c ea u c t i o n ss t e m sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a ta taﬁrst price auction, the ring cannot capture
the entire collusive gain. Because a proﬁt a b l er i n ga taﬁrst price auction must reduce
the bids submitted by the ring members relative to their non-cooperative bids, some
of the collusive gain must go to the bidders outside the ring or, if outside bidders
respond to collusion by increasing their bids, then to the auctioneer.
Proposition 5 At a ﬁrst price auction, there is no proﬁtable pre-auction mechanism
such that the ring captures the entire collusive gain.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 identiﬁes a reason why collusion may not be sustainable at a ﬁrst
price auction–some of the gains from collusion necessarily spill over to the outside
bidders or possibly the auctioneer. For example, in the case of only one outside
bidder, he always proﬁts from the presence of a ring because even if the outside
bidder does not change from his non-cooperative bid function, his expected payoﬀ
is strictly higher when the ring members bid collusively, i.e., reduce their bids, than
when they bid non-cooperatively.
34The problem in such a mechanism is that a ring member might have an incentive to report
an amount less than his value. By under reporting, a ring member might cause the highest bid
submitted by any other ring member to be lower, and so allow the deviating ring member to win
the object at a price lower than he could have otherwise. To deter under reporting, it is suﬃcient
that the center be able to penalize ring members who win the object but did not have the highest
report.
224.3 Bid Submission Mechanisms
Because the deﬁnition of an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism requires
that a bidder not prefer to submit any bid other than his recommended bid, it is
clear that such a mechanism continues to be incentive compatible when we allow shill
bidders. More formally, for a bid coordination mechanism, the constraint of incentive
compatibility for not using a shill is implied by constraint of incentive compatibility
for bidding. However, this is not the case for a bid submission mechanism.I nabid
submission mechanism,ar i n gm e m b e r ’ sb i da ﬀects his payment to the center, which
enters the incentive compatibility constraint for bidding. Thus, a ring member may
choose one “oﬃcial” bid because of its eﬀect on his payment to the center, and then
use a shill bidder to submit a higher bid at the auction. Ring member i’s payment to
the center is not aﬀected by a bid submitted on his behalf by a shill bidder, but his
expected payoﬀ from the auction depends on the maximum of his “oﬃcial” bid and
the bid submitted by his shill.
As the following proposition shows, although a bid submission mechanism may
be able to suppress all ring competition, shills strictly reduce the proﬁtability of the
ring.
Proposition 6 For a ﬁrst price auction, the ability to use shills weakly reduces the
expected joint payoﬀ of the ring members from any proﬁtable bid submission mech-
anism, and strictly for one that suppresses all ring competition.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If the ring mechanism operates by essentially sending only one ring member to
bid at the auction and suppressing the bids of the other ring members, then any ring
m e m b e rn o ts e n tt ot h ea u c t i o nc a np r o ﬁtably use a shill as long as there is some
probability that the ring member oﬃcially sent to the auction submits a bid strictly
below his value–the latter being a necessity for collusion to be proﬁtable. Viewed
23together with Corollary 2, Proposition 6 implies that the presence of shills has a
weakly larger impact on the proﬁtability of a ring when the auction is ﬁrst price than
when it is second price.
Proposition 6 implies that shills can reduce the ring’s payoﬀ,b u tt h en e x tp r o p o -
sition shows that, in fact, shills mean that a ring at a ﬁrst price auction may not be
able to do any better by using a bid submission mechanism than it could by using a
bid coordination mechanism. Proposition 7 assumes that the center can use a shill to
submit a bid–this allows the center for a bid coordination mechanism to submit a bid
just below the bid of the high-valuing ring member to prevent downward deviations.
Proposition 7 In a ﬁrst price auction, if the center can submit a bid, then the
maximum expected payoﬀ to a ring from a bid submission mechanism is equal to
the maximum expected payoﬀ to a ring from a bid coordination mechanism.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Clearly, a ring can do at least as well using a bid submission mechanism as it
can using a bid coordination mechanism. But Proposition 7 says the possibility of
using shill bidders negates any advantage to the ring from using a bid submission
mechanism. In particular, Proposition 7 says that if we allow the center to submit
ab i d ,ar i n ga taﬁrst price auction cannot do any better with a bid submission
mechanism than it could with a bid coordination mechanism.
4.4 Environments without shill bidders
In this section we show that there do exist environments in which collusion can be sus-
tained at a ﬁrst price auction. In particular, we consider bid submission mechanisms
in an environment without shill bidders.35 In this environment, the ring mechanism
35In this environment, for a second price auction, Corollary 1 implies that there exists a proﬁtable,
ex post eﬃcient mechanism that allows the ring to capture the entire collusive gain.
24can ﬁx ring members’ bids (as a function of the reports) by requiring a large payment
from ring members who bid anything other than the center’s recommended bids. One
way a mechanism like this might be implemented is by requiring that certain ring
members not attend the auction or by having the center submit bids on behalf of the
ring members.
We construct a mechanism in which ring members report their values and then
only the highest-valuing ring member bids at the auction against the outside bidders,
implying that all ring competition is suppressed. The center recommends that the
highest-valuing ring member bid according to the equilibrium bid function for an
auction in which the highest-valuing ring member bids against the n − k outside
bidders. Let β
in(v) be the equilibrium ﬁrst price bid for a ring member whose value
v is the highest in the ring when facing the n − k outside bidders, and let β
out
i (v) be
























Note that the equilibrium bid function for the ring member, β
in, does not depend




equilibrium of the auction subgame for a mechanism that prevents all but the highest-
valuing ring member from bidding at the auction, but does not place any restriction









Consider a payment rule that requires that ring members whose reports are less
than the highest report pay ¯ v to the center if they bid an amount greater than v,
and zero otherwise, and that the ring member with the highest report pay ˆ p(r) to
25the center, where r is the second-highest report and









which can be implemented by having the ring members compete in a second price ex
ante auction for the right to be the sole ring member who bids at the main auction
(see Graham and Marshall (1987)). The mechanism recommends bids of v for ring
members who do not have the highest report and recommends a bid of β
in(ri) for the
ring member i with the highest report. This mechanism induces truthful revelation,
and it is a best reply for bidders to follow the recommendations of the ring (see the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 ) .
Given this payment rule, ex ante budget balance for the center implies an ex ante











i (v) be the non-cooperative equilibrium ﬁrst price bid for bidder i with
value v facing n − 1 other bidders, the interim individual rationality constraint for
ring member i with value vi can be written as the requirement that gi(vi | ˆ p) ≥ 0,
where gi is deﬁned by



























where the ﬁrst term is the ex ante non-contingent payment, the second term is the
expected surplus from the auction, the third term is the expected payment to the
center, and the fourth term is the expected surplus from non-cooperative play.
Proposition 8 In the absence of shill bidding, there exists a proﬁtable bid submis-
sion mechanism for a ﬁrst price auction that suppresses all ring competition if, for
all i ∈ {1,...,k}, Evi (gi(vi | ˆ p)) ≥ 0, with a strict inequality for some i.
36Non-symmetric payments could also be made.
26Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 provides conditions under which a proﬁtable collusive mechanism
exists for a ﬁrst price auction, but leaves unanswered the question whether these
conditions can be satisﬁed. Even assuming symmetric bidders, the bid functions β
in
and β
out cannot be represented analytically, so we rely on a numerical calculation to
show that the conditions of Proposition 8 can be satisﬁed.
Proposition 9 In the absence of shill bidding, there exists a proﬁtable bid submis-
sion mechanism for a ﬁrst price auction that suppresses all ring competition when
n =3 ,k=2 , and values are drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1].
Proof. See the Appendix.37
Proposition 9 shows that for some environments without shills, a bid submission
mechanism can suppress all ring competition. In contrast, Proposition 2, which holds
with or without shills, shows that no bid coordination mechanism can suppress all
ring competition. Furthermore, the mechanism constructed to prove Proposition 9
shows that for some environments without shills, a bid submission mechanism can
achieve the same outcome as a mechanism that prevents all but the highest-valuing
ring member from attending the auction. In contrast, Proposition 4, which holds
with or without shills, implies that no bid coordination mechanism can achieve this
outcome.
T h er e s u l tt h a tc o l l u s i o na taﬁrst price auction can be proﬁtable requires the
assumption that the use of shills is not possible. This is because a ring member
with less than the highest value, although prevented from bidding at the auction
himself because the center can base payments on the ring member’s bid, may have
37The conditions of Assumption 1 are not satisﬁed in this example since the distribution of the
highest from two uniform random variables is F(x)=x2; however, the conditions provided by
Lebrun (2002) are satisﬁed (see footnote 16).
27an incentive to compete against the high-valuing ring member using a shill, which
reduces the proﬁtability of the ring.
The proof of Proposition 9 involves the numerical calculation of the ex ante in-
dividual rationality constraint using the methods of Marshall et al. (1994) to solve
for the equilibrium bid functions. It is interesting that in the example of Proposition
9, although ex ante individual rationality is satisﬁed, interim individual rationality
is not satisﬁed for ring members with values above approximately 0.8.38 Thus, under
interim individual rationality, bidders with suﬃciently high values are not willing to
join the ring. A potential ring member must weigh whether he captures enough of
the collusive gain to justify deviating from non-cooperative play, and bidder with a
high value typically gains less from collusive play because his required payment to
the center is larger than the ex ante non-contingent payment. In eﬀect, ring members
with high values subsidize ring members with low values in satisfying the center’s ex
ante balanced-budget constraint.
For a one-shot auction, the appropriate individual rationality is interim individual
rationality if potential ring members learn their values before deciding whether to join
the ring. For example, in Deﬁnition 1, the individual rationality constraint for ring
member i would need to be modiﬁed so that the expectations are taken with respect
to v−i rather than with respect to the entire vector of ring members’ values.
With this modiﬁcation, Propositions 1—7 continue to hold. However, when we
modify Proposition 8 to require for all i ∈ {1,...,k}, gi(vi | ˆ p) ≥ 0,w h i c hi st h e
interim individual rationality constraint for a bid submission mechanism at a ﬁrst
price auction, then Proposition 9 no longer holds. In Appendix A, we show that with
an all-inclusive ring, the interim individual rationality constraint can be satisﬁed.
38I nf a c t ,w eh a v eb e e nu n a b l et oﬁnd any example within the context implicitly deﬁned by
Proposition 8 in which interim individual rationality is satisﬁed for all feasible value realizations.
285D i s c u s s i o n
We are interested in collusive mechanisms that do not rely on information from the
auctioneer, such as the identity of the winner or the amount paid. We refer to these
mechanisms as pre-auction mechanisms. Within this class of mechanisms, we identify
two types. The ﬁrst type of mechanism, a bid coordination mechanism, gathers
information from the ring members regarding their values for the object, arranges
for transfers among ring members, and makes recommendations on how they should
bid at the auction. The second type of mechanism, a bid submission mechanism,
gathers the same information from the bidders and arranges for transfers, but instead
of merely recommending bids to the ring members, the ring center controls the bids
submitted by the ring members. However, the center cannot prevent ring members
from using a shill bidders to submit additional bids at the auction. We consider the
eﬀectiveness of these two types of pre-auction mechanisms in facilitating collusion at
ﬁrst and second price auctions.
We show that at a second price auction, pre-auction mechanisms allow the ring to
suppress all competition among ring members and to capture the entire collusive gain.
In contrast, at a ﬁrst price auction this is not the case–a bid coordination mechanism
cannot suppress all competition among ring members, and regardless of which type of
mechanism is used, a ring cannot capture the entire collusive gain. Bidders at a ﬁrst
price auction are limited in their ability to proﬁtably collude by the facts that (i) a
ring may not be able to suppress competition among its members, (ii) the gain to the
ring is reduced by leakage to the outside bidders (lower bids by ring members imply
increased payoﬀs for outside bidders), and (iii) ring members may have an incentive
to use shill bidders. Despite these limitations, proﬁtable collusion is possible at a ﬁrst
price auction in some cases. We provide a characterization of proﬁtable pre-auction
mechanisms at a ﬁrst price auction, and for some cases provide examples establishing
that proﬁtable pre-auction mechanisms exist for ﬁrst price auctions. However, we
have not proven the existence of a proﬁtable bid coordination mechanism for a ﬁrst
29price auction, although we do provide a characterization. Establishing existence is
an important topic for future research.
Our characterization result for bid coordination mechanisms for a ﬁrst price auc-
tion provides us with an important empirical implication. In particular, Proposition
4 tells us that the ring using a bid coordination mechanism must sometimes require
multiple bids from the ring–a high bid and another that is just below it. The ob-
servational signiﬁcance of this result requires further explanation. To begin, this
characterization distinguishes a bid coordination mechanism from a bid submission
mechanism since, as shown in Proposition 9, a ring using a bid submission mechanism
need only submit one bid when the use of shills can be prevented. Further, Appendix
A, where we consider an all-inclusive ring, shows that an all-inclusive ring need only
submit one bid when the use of shills can be prevented. Thus, with regard to the
results of this paper, the clustering of ring bids described in Proposition 4 is unique.
One other auction environment in which one sees clustered bids is a ﬁrst price
auction with complete information w h e r eb i d d e r sa c tn o n - c o o p e r a t i v e l y . In this case,
equilibrium behavior involves the highest-valuing bidder’s submitting a bid equal to
the second-highest value, while the second-highest-valuing bidder aggressively mixes
under his value. This implies that the two high bids will be very close to one an-
other. But a key feature diﬀerentiates the “close” collusive bids of Proposition 4
from the “close” non-cooperative bids of a complete information environment. The
close collusive bids are ring bids and so may or may not be the highest two bids
submitted at the auction, depending on the bids of the outside bidders. But the close
non-cooperative bids of a complete information environment are always the highest
and second-highest bids. In other words, a prediction of Proposition 4 that is entirely
unique to collusion is that we will regularly observe pairs of non-winning bids that
are very close to one another. This provides a way to detect collusion that requires
little information about the bidders or the items being sold.39
39One might expect to see close bids under non-cooperative bidding when values are close, but
then with a discrete bid increment, one would also expect to see ties occasionally, something that
30A policy implication of our results seems clear–if collusion is a major concern for
auction designers, then a ﬁr s tp r i c ea u c t i o ns h o u l db eu s e dr a t h e rt h a nas e c o n dp r i c e
auction. Another implication for auctioneers (or procurement agents) is to maintain
a record of all bids, not just those of winners. As Proposition 4 makes clear, there is
potentially a large amount of information in the diﬀerence between sequential bids.
would not be expected under collusion.
31A Appendix: All-inclusive Ring
When the ring is all-inclusive (k = n), collusion can be proﬁtable in a wider set of en-
vironments. Our positive results for collusion at a second price auction (Propositions
1 and Corollary 1) continue to hold for an all-inclusive ring, and our negative result
for a bid coordination mechanism at a ﬁrst price auction (Proposition 2) continues
to hold,40 but there are some cases in which collusion is proﬁt a b l ea taﬁrst price
auction when the ring is all-inclusive, but collusion is not proﬁtable when the ring is
not all-inclusive.
Consider a bid submission mechanism at a ﬁrst price auction when the use of shills
is not possible. Suppose ring members report their values and the center recommends
that the ring member with the highest report bid v and all others bid less than v or
not at all. Ring members whose reports are less than the highest report pay ¯ v to the
center if they bid an amount greater than or equal to zero, and the ring member with
the highest report pays r2 − v to the center, where r2 is the second-highest report.
This mechanism induces truthful revelation and it is a best reply for bidders to follow
the recommendation of the ring.
To show that collusion is proﬁtable, we need only show that individual rationality
is satisﬁed. Ex ante budget balance for the center implies an ex ante non-contingent







(vj − v)1 vi≥vj≥max ∈{1,...,n}\{i,j} v 
´
.
The interim individual rationality for ring member i with value vi c a nb ew r i t t e na s
40The proof follows as before letting k = n and assuming the center recommends that ring members
with less than the highest value bid an amount less than v or do not bid at all.
41Diﬀerential payments, reﬂecting bidders diﬀerent ex ante marginal contributions to the ring, are
also possible (see Graham, Marshall, and Richard (1990), especially Theorem 7).
32the requirement that ga
i (vi) ≥ 0, where ga
i is deﬁned by
g
a
i (vi) ≡ X
a + Ev−i
³



















where the ﬁrst term is the ex ante non-contingent payment, the second term is the
expected surplus from the auction, the third term is the expected payment to the










i (vi)=Xa for all vi, implying that interim individual rationality is satisﬁed.42 This
also implies that, for symmetric bidders, ex ante individual rationality is satisﬁed.



















that is, the expected value of the highest from n minus the expected value of the
second-highest from n is greater than or equal to the expected surplus from the
winner of the auction under non-cooperative play.
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition A.1 Assuming no shills, symmetric bidders, and an all-inclusive ring,
there exists a proﬁtable, ex post eﬃcient bid submission mechanism for ﬁrst price
auction satisfying interim individual rationality that suppresses all ring competition
and allows the ring to capture the entire collusive gain.
42 To see that interim individual rationality is not necessarily satisﬁed for this mechanism when
bidders are asymmetric, consider the case in which k =2 , F1(x)=x, and F2(x)=x100. Then
β
nc
1 (1) = β
nc
2 (1) ∼ = 0.7391 (see Marshall et al. (1994)). The cdf for the second highest value is






¢ ∼ = 0.2500. If
ring member 1 has value 1, his expected payment to the center is 100
101, so his expected payoﬀ from
joining the ring is 0.2500 + 1 − 100
101 = .2599, which is less than his expected non-cooperative payoﬀ
of 0.2609.
33Proposition A.1 contrasts with the result in the text for the case of symmetric
bidders with two ring members, one bidder outside the ring, and values drawn from
the uniform distribution on [0,1]. In that case, interim individual rationality is not
satisﬁed for ring members with values greater than approximately 0.8. Proposition
A.1 shows that when the ring is all-inclusive and bidders are symmetric, interim
individual rationality is satisﬁed for any number of bidders and any distribution of
values.
34B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the following bidding rule: if bidder i’s report is not
highest, the center recommends a bid of v, and if bidder i’s report is highest, the center
recommends a bid equal to the report. Note that if the bidders report truthfully, there
is no incentive for any bidder to deviate from the center’s recommendation, even with
a shill. Consider the following payment rule: if bidder i’s report is not highest, bidder
i pays zero, but if bidder i’s report is highest and r2 is the second-highest report, then
bidder i pays the center ˆ p(r2)=Evk+1,...,vn
³¡





Note that under this payment rule, the center has positive expected revenue and so
c a nm a k ep o s i t i v ee xa n t en o n - c o n t i n g e n tp a y m e n t st ot h er i n gm e m b e r s .
Suppose the other k − 1 ring members report truthfully. If a ring member with
value v1 reports v1 + ε (where ε>0) rather than v1, his payoﬀ diﬀers only if the
highest other value in the ring is v2 ∈ (v1,v 1 + ε). In this case, if the ring member
reports truthfully his payoﬀ is zero, and if he reports v1+ε and bids v1 at the auction
(his weakly dominant strategy in the continuation game), his expected payoﬀ is
ˆ p(v1) − Ev2 (ˆ p(v2) | v2 ∈ (v1,v 1 + ε)) < ˆ p(v1) − ˆ p(v1)=0 .
Thus, the ring member has no incentive to deviate in this way. If a ring member with
value v1 reports v1 − ε (where ε>0) rather than v1, his payoﬀ diﬀers only if the
highest other value in the ring is v2 ∈ (v1 − ε,v1). In this case, if the ring member
reports truthfully, his expected payoﬀ is ˆ p(v1) − Ev2 (ˆ p(v2) | v2 ∈ (v1 − ε,v1)), and if














v1 − maxj∈{k+1,...,n} vj
¢
1v1≥maxj∈{k+1,...,n} vj≥v2


















v2 − maxj∈{k+1,...,n} vj
¢













v2 − maxj∈{k+1,...,n} vj
¢
1v2≥maxj∈{k+1,...,n} vj | v2 ∈ (v1 − ε,v1)


=ˆ p(v1) − Ev2 (ˆ p(v2) | v2 ∈ (v1 − ε,v1)),
w h i c hi st h es a m ea sh i sp a y o ﬀ from reporting truthfully. Thus, there is no incentive
to deviate in this way.
We have shown that bidders report truthfully. It remains to show that individual
rationality is satisﬁed. If bidder i does not join the ring, play is non-cooperative, and
bidder i with value vi expects payoﬀ Ev−i
¡
(vi − maxj6=i vj)1 vi≥maxj6=i vj
¢
. If bidder


















where the ﬁrst term is his expected payoﬀ from the auction and the second term is his
expected payment to the center. Note that the payoﬀ from the auction is positive only
if i’s value is the highest among all n bidders, i.e., vi ≥ maxj6=i vj,b u tt h ep a y m e n t
t ot h ec e n t e rm u s tb em a d ei fi’s value is the highest among the k ring members,







































which is equal to bidder i’s expected payoﬀ if he does not join the ring. Because
we have excluded the ex ante payments, interim individual rationality is satisﬁed
strictly. Furthermore, ex ante individual rationality is also satisﬁed strictly. Because
the mechanism does not rely on the bids submitted at the auction or the identity of
the winner, it is not aﬀected by the possibility of shills. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose there is an incentive compatible, proﬁtable collusive
mechanism in which non-highest-valuing ring members bid v.T h e n r i n g m e m b e r s
truthfully report their values and bid according to the recommendations of the center.
Let ι be the index of the ring member (randomly selected in the case of a tie) with
the highest report. Because ring member ι’s payment to the ring does not depend
upon his bid at the auction, his recommended bid must be optimal in the auction
subgame. In particular, it must be that the center’s recommended bid to bidder ι,













(vι − b)1b≥maxj∈{k+1,...,n} βj(vj)
´










Notice that the recommended bid to bidder ι depends only on bidder ι’s value and not
on the other ring members’ values or the identity of the highest-valuing ring member,
37so we can deﬁne function ˆ β such that βι(v1,...,v k)=ˆ β(vι). Note also that for all
v>v , ˆ β(v) <v .
Suppose ring member i has value vi ∈ (ˆ β(vι),v ι), which is a positive probability
event. Let Ii be bidder i’s information, if any, about the values of the other ring
members as a result of learning his required payment to the center and his recom-
mended bid. Given this information, bidder i forms beliefs (correct in equilibrium)
about the values of the other ring members. Because the center recommends that
ring member i bid v,r i n gm e m b e ri’s belief must be that the probability that his
value is highest is zero. Using the monotonicity of ˆ β, this implies that i believes there
is zero probability that a bid of ˆ β(vi) would win the auction. Furthermore, since
vi ∈ (ˆ β(vι),v ι) and beliefs are correct in equilibrium, ring member i must believe
that there is positive probability that the center’s highest recommended bid is less
than i’s value, i.e., Ev−i
³
1ˆ β(vι)<vi | Ii
´
> 0. Thus, ring member i believes he has zero
probability of winning the auction with a bid of ˆ β(vi), but believes there exists some
bid less than his value, but above ˆ β(vi), with positive probability of winning. Thus,
ring member i can proﬁtably deviate from his recommended bid, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3. Let bidders 1 and 2 be the highest and second-highest-valuing
ring members, in no particular order. Let ˆ β
in
be the bid function used by the ring
members, and let ˆ β
out







, if i ∈ {1,...,k}
ˆ β
out





































(v − b)1 b≥maxj6=n ˆ βj(vj)
´
.
Thus, for all i ∈ {1,...,n}, ˆ βi(v) ∈ argmaxb Ev−i
³
(v − b)1 b≥maxj6=i ˆ βj(vj)
´
, which,
using the uniqueness result of Lemma 1, implies ˆ βi(v)=β
nc
i (v). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose there exists an incentive compatible bid coordination
mechanism. Let ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn be the equilibrium bid functions for the outside bidders.
Case 1. There exists a positive-measure set of ring members’ values such that the
highest ring bid is less than β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). Given ring members’ val-
ues in this set, after the ring announcements, but prior to bidding, there exists a ring
member i whose information is such that he believes that there is positive probability
that his value is highest, in which case all other ring members have recommended
bids less than β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). Such a ring member can proﬁtably deviate by bid-
ding β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). To see this, suppose that ring member i’s recommended bid
is highest in the ring. Then by increasing his bid to be an optimal bid against the
outside bidders, the ring member increases his expected payoﬀ.I f r i n g m e m b e r i’s
recommended bid is not highest in the ring, then by increasing his bid, he at least
weakly increases his expected payoﬀ. This provides a contradiction.
Case 2. For all but a zero-measure set of values for ring members, the high-
est bid from the ring is β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). Suppose that the highest
ring bid is submitted by a ring member whose value is not highest in the ring.
Then the highest-valuing ring member receives a recommended bid that is less than
β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). In this case, the highest-valuing ring member’s infor-
mation is such that he believes he will win with his recommended bid with probabil-
ity zero, but that he will win with a bid greater than β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn)
but less than maxj∈{1,...,k} vj (his value) with positive probability, implying that the
39highest-valuing ring member has a proﬁtable deviation, a contradiction. Thus, for all
but a zero-measure set of values for ring members, the highest bid from the ring is
β











(v − b)1 b≥maxj∈{k+1,...,n} bm
j (vj)
´
and for all i ∈ {k +1 ,...,n},
b
m











n a r ej u s tt h ee q u i l i b r i u mb i df u n c t i o n sf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
n − k +1bidders compete against one another, where one bidder’s value is the




n exist and are unique, implying that β
∗ = β
m and for all i ∈ {k +1,...,n},
ˆ bi = bm
i .
Because β
m(vi) is an optimal bid for ring member i if he has no competition from
other ring members, ring member i, given his information, never strictly prefers to
bid an amount less than β
m(vi). In addition, ring member i never strictly prefers to
b i da na m o u n tg r e a t e rt h a nvi. This allows us to restrict attention to bids in the
interval [β





(vi − b)1 b≥max{maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} βj(vk),maxj∈{k+1,...,n} bm








The remainder of the proof shows that for a positive-measure set of ring members’
values, there exists a ring member i whose value is not highest in the ring, and whose
recommended bid is β
m(vi), but for whom the maximand in (B.2) is increasing in b
at b = β
m(vi), which completes our proof.




(vi − b)1 b≥max{maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} βj(vk),maxj∈{k+1,...,n} bm












where the equality holds because, conditional on β
m(vi) > maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} βj(vk),
ring member i wins the auction if and only if his bid exceeds the bids of the outside
bidders. Using this equality and letting
Ai(b) ≡ Ev−i
³







(vi − b)1 b≥max{maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} βj(vk),maxj∈{k+1,...,n} bm
j (vj)}
| Ii,β
m(vi) ≤ maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} βj(vk)

,



















=0(Assumption 1 implies diﬀerentiability). Note that Bi(β
m(vi);Ii)=
0 and for all b ∈ [β
m(vi),v i],B i(b;Ii) ≥ 0.
T h en e x ts t e pi nt h ep r o o fi st oc o n s i d e rar i n gm e m b e ri with value vi and the
set of other ring members’ values such that the maximum value for the other ring
members is greater than or equal to vi, but the maximum bid for the other ring
members using bid function β
m is less than vi. We can easily show that ring member
i’s prior distribution must give positive weight to the possibility that this occurs. But
then we can show that there must be a positive-measure set of values for ring members
other than i such than ring member i’s information results in a posterior that gives






will allow us to complete the proof.
41Let G(·) be the joint distribution of the values of the ring members other than i,
and let ¯ G(·) be the distribution of the highest from the values of the ring members
other than i. To conserve on notation, let Xi(vi) be the set of values for ring members
other than i such that the maximum value for the other ring members is greater than
or equal to vi, but the maximum bid for the other ring members using bid function
β













Then, using the assumption of independent values, for b ∈ [β
m(vi),v i] we can rewrite
Bi as




























































where the second equality holds because the highest ring bid is β
m(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj)
and is submitted by the highest-valuing ring member, and the third equality holds
because the expected payoﬀ from a bid b ∈ [β
m(vi),v i] is zero conditional on vi <
β







is equal to zero when
evaluated at b = β
m(vi). Thus,
∂Bi(βm(vi);Ii)














m(vi) ≥ maxj∈{k+1,...,n} bj(vj)
¢
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(vi)) − ¯ G(vi)
,








−i ∈ Xi (vi)
´
> 0. (B.5)
Let V (vi,x,y) be the set of values for ring members other than i that are consistent















Then the probability that a ring member with value vi has information Ii =( vi,x,y),
conditional on vk








−i ∈ Xi(vi))d˜ v
k
−i,
which is well deﬁned because we assume βi and pi are measurable functions. Note
that because beliefs are correct in equilibrium, the unconditional beliefs must be equal
to the integral of the conditional beliefs over all possible information. Thus, using
(B.5) (evaluated at b = β
m(vi)),



















−i ∈ Xi(vi)) ·
P(βi(vi, ˜ v
k













which implies that for a positive measure subset of Xi(vi), call it ˜ Xi(vi), ring member
i’s information is such that
¯ g(vi | Ii,v
k
−i ∈ Xi(vi)) > 0. (B.6)
Let vk be such that vi >vand vk
−i ∈ ˜ Xi(vi) (a positive probability event). In this
case, ring member i, given his information, must place positive probability weight on
43the event that a bid of less than his value wins the auction. If ring member i’s recom-
mended bid is not equal to β
m(vi), then ring member i knows with probability one
that his recommendation is not highest and that a bid equal to his recommended bid
has zero probability of winning the auction, implying that the ring member can prof-
itably deviate by bidding some amount greater than his recommended bid, but less
than his value, a contradiction. Thus, it must be that ring member i’s recommended
bid is equal to β
m(vi). In addition, ring member i’s information must be such that
(B.4) holds. Then, using (B.6),
∂Bi(βm(vi);Ii)
∂b > 0. Furthermore, ring member i’s in-
f o r m a t i o nm u s tb es u c ht h a tPr
¡
β
m(vi) ≤ maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} βj(vk) | Ii
¢
> 0. But then,
using (B.3), ring member i can proﬁtably deviate by bidding some amount greater
than β
m(vi). Since ring member i’s recommended bid is β
m(vi), this is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn be the equilibrium bid functions for the outside
bidders. Let B(v1,...,vk) be the equilibrium highest ring bid as a function of v1,...,vk.
By Lemma 2, for all but a zero-measure set of ring members’ values, B(v1,...,v k) ≥
β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn), and a strict inequality for a positive-measure set of
values.
Suppose that for all but a zero-measure set of value realizations, one ring member
bids B(v1,...,vk) and all other ring members bid some amount less than
β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). Suppose that for a given vector of ring members’ val-
ues, ring member i is the ring member whose recommended bid is B(v1,...,vk), and
suppose that vi <B (v1,...,vk). Then ring member i’s beliefs place positive probabil-
ity on his winning the auction with a bid equal to B(v1,...,vk), a n ds or i n gm e m b e r
i can proﬁtably deviate by bidding vi, a contradiction. Thus, for all ring members’
values, if ring member i’s recommended bid is B(v1,...,v k) then B(v1,...,vk) ≤ vi.
Suppose that the ring member whose recommended bid is B(v1,...,vk) is not the
ring member with the highest value. If ring member i is the ring member with the
44highest value, then ring member i’s recommended bid is less than β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn),
a n ds or i n gm e m b e ri’s beliefs place probability one on his recommended bid not
being the highest among the ring members, and ring member i’s beliefs place positive
probability on the highest recommended bid from among the ring members being less
than his value. Thus, ring member i can proﬁtably deviate by submitting a bid greater
than β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn) but less than vi, a contradiction. Thus, for all ring members’
values, it must be the ring member with the highest value whose recommended bid
is B(v1,...,vk).
Let ring member i be a ring member such that with positive probability ring
member i’s value is highest in the ring and his recommended bid is strictly greater
than β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn) (at least one such ring member must exist). In
such cases, ring member i has a recommended bid greater than β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn) and
believes that (i) if his value is highest, then all other ring members’ recommended bids
are less than β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn), in which case, by the deﬁnition of β
∗, ring member
i strictly prefers to deviate from his recommended bid by bidding β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn),
and (ii) if his value is not highest, then his recommended bid has probability zero
of winning, so he is no worse oﬀ by bidding β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn). In such cases, ring
member i’ si n f o r m a t i o nm u s tb es u c ht h a th eb e l i e v e sh i sv a l u ei sh i g h e s tw i t hp o s i t i v e
probability, so the deviation to β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn) is proﬁtable, a contradiction. Thus,
at least one ring member in addition to the highest-valuing ring member must bid
greater than or equal to β
∗(maxj∈{1,...,k} vj;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn).
To complete the proof, suppose that there exists ε>0 such that there is zero prob-
ability that the two highest ring bids are within ε of each other. Suppose the highest
recommended bid to any ring member is to ring member i, and suppose the recommen-
dation, βi, satisﬁes βi >β
∗(vi;ˆ bk+1,...,ˆ bn), which is a positive probability event. Then











45Proof of Proposition 5. Using the deﬁnition of capturing the entire collusive gain, the
proposition can be rewritten as the statement that there exists v such that either (i)
Rµ(v) <R nc(v), (ii) Rµ(v) >R nc(v) and either Sµ(v) >S nc(v) or Oµ(v) >O nc(v),
or (iii) Rµ(v)=Rnc(v) and either Sµ(v) 6= Snc(v) or Oµ(v) 6= Onc(v). Suppose
that for all v, Rµ(v) ≥ Rnc(v) and that for all v,R µ(v)=Rnc(v) implies Sµ(v)=
Snc(v) and Oµ(v)=Onc(v). Since µ is assumed proﬁtable, there exists non-zero-
measure set V such that for all v ∈ V, Rµ(v) >R nc(v). To prove the result, we
must show that there exists v such that either Sµ(v) >S nc(v) or Oµ(v) >O nc(v).
Assume that for all v ∈ V, Sµ(v) ≤ Snc(v). We now show that there exists v such









n(vn)) be the equilibrium bids













Note that for i ∈ {1,...,k},β
µ
i is a function of v1,...,vk rather than just vi because
the center’s bid recommendations are a function of the entire vector of reports.





j (vj). Because for all v ∈ V, Rµ(v) >R nc(v), it follows that for all




































To see this, note that the ring’s gain from the collusive mechanism must be due to
one of two causes: in (B.7), a ring member wins under the collusive mechanism, but
not under non-cooperative play, and in (B.8), a ring member wins both under the
collusive mechanism and under non-cooperative play, but the high ring bid is lower
under the collusive mechanism than under non-cooperative play.
46Partition V into V1 and V2, where (B.7) holds on V1 and (B.8) holds on V2. Suppose
V1 is a positive-measure set of values. Now consider outside bidder i ∈ {k +1,...,n}.
If outside bidder i bids according to β
µ















| (vi,v −i) ∈ V1
¶















| (vi,v −i) ∈ V2
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| (vi,v −i) ∈ V
c
¶
Pr((vi,v −i) ∈ V
c).
Consider a deviation by bidder i to β
nc
i . Then, using (B.7), his payoﬀ conditional on
(vi,v −i) ∈ V1 strictly increases, and this conditioning event has positive probability.
Using (B.8), his payoﬀ conditional on (vi,v −i) ∈ V2 weakly increases. Using the
deﬁnition of V c, his payoﬀ conditional on (vi,v −i) ∈ V c does not change. Thus, it is
ap r o ﬁtable deviation for outside bidder i to use his non-cooperative bid function, a
contradiction. Thus, V1 must be a zero-measure set, implying that the ring’s increase
in payoﬀ is due entirely to winning at lower bids.
Once again consider outside bidder i ∈ {k +1 ,...,n}. Using (B.8), for v ∈ V2,


















For v ∈ V c, maxj∈{1,...,k} ˆ β
µ
j(v)=m a x j∈{1,...,n} β
nc
j (vj). If outside bidder i bids ac-
cording to β
nc
i when all other bidders bid collusively, then bidder i wins with his
non-cooperative bid whenever β
nc
i (vi) ≥ maxj6=i β
nc
j (vj), i.e., whenever i would have
won under non-cooperative play. Thus, by revealed preference, bidder i’s expected
cooperative payoﬀ must be greater than or equal to his expected non-cooperative
payoﬀ. Furthermore, using (B.8) and the fact that V2 is a positive-measure set, there
must exist an outside bidder whose expected payoﬀ from using his non-cooperative
bid function against the collusive mechanism is strictly greater than his expected pay-
oﬀ under non-cooperative play, implying Ev (Oµ(v)) >E v (Onc(v)), which implies
that there exists v such that Oµ(v) >O nc(v). Q.E.D.
47Proof of Proposition 6. Because the use of a shill does not aﬀect a ring member’s
payment to the center, the proof of Proposition 2 implies that for any collusive mech-
anism for a ﬁrst price auction in which non-highest-valuing ring members bid v,t h e r e
is positive probability that a ring member can increase his expected payoﬀ by using a
shill to submit a bid greater than the bid recommended by the center. In particular,




, whose recommended bid is
v, can proﬁtably deviate by using a shill to bid vi − ε for some ε ∈ (0,v i − v). We
must show that the use of a shill by ring member i to bid vi−ε reduces the expected
payoﬀ to the ring. Suppose not. The expected joint payoﬀ to the k ring members if















The expected joint payoﬀ to the k ring members if ring member i uses a shill to bid
vi − ε must take into account the probability that the ring member with the highest



























By our supposition, (B.9) is less than or equal to (B.10). Because maxj∈{1,...,k}\{i} vj >























48But then (B.9) is less than (B.11), which violates the deﬁnition of β
in b e c a u s ei ti m -















Proof of Proposition 7. A bid coordination mechanism is a more restrictive mechanism
than a bid submission mechanism, so the maximum expected payoﬀ t oar i n gf r o ma
bid submission mechanism is greater than or equal to the maximum expected payoﬀ
t oar i n gf r o mabid coordination mechanism. Thus, to prove the proposition, we
need only show that the expected payoﬀ t oar i n gf r o ma n yg i v e nbid submission
mechanism is less than or equal to the maximum expected payoﬀ t oar i n gf r o mabid
coordination mechanism. Take a particular proﬁtable bid submission mechanism, call
it µ, as given. Note that the maximum ring bid must be less than the value of the ring
member submitting that bid. Let β
µ(vk) be the recommended bids in mechanism µ,
and let p
µ
i (vk;bk) be the required payments in mechanism µ (as a function of the ring
members’ reports and their bids). Consider the following bid coordination mechanism,
call it µ0: let the recommended bids be β
µ(vk), and let the required payment for ring
member i be pi(vk) ≡ p
µ
i (vk,β
µ(vk)), which is the required payment from mechanism
µ evaluated at the recommended bids rather than at the actual bids. In addition,
have the ring center submit a bid using a mixed strategy that mixes aggressively
just below the highest recommended bid for the ring members (for example, have the
center mix according to a distribution that satisﬁes the conditions of Hirshleifer and
Riley (1993, p.374).43 Then the information Ii available to ring member i at the time
he chooses his bid is the same under both mechanism µ and mechanism µ0,e x c e p t
under mechanism µ0 bidders know that no downward deviation from a recommended
bid that is less than their value is proﬁtable. (If the recommended bid were greater
than or equal to a ring member’s value, then a deviation might be proﬁtable.) Because
43We are in an environment in which shill bidding is possible, so it seems reasonable to assume
that the ring center could also use a shill to submit a bid at the auction.
49ab i do fβ
µ
i (vk) is optimal in mechanism µ (i.e., there is no incentive to use a shill),
it must be that β
µ
i (vk) does at least as well in expectation as any b ≥ β
µ
i (vk). Thus,
ab i do fβ
µ
i (vk) is also optimal in mechanism µ0. Thus, the expected payoﬀ to the
ring from bid submission mechanism µ is the same as the expected payoﬀ from bid
coordination mechanism µ0, implying that the expected payoﬀ t oar i n gf r o mbid
submission mechanism µ is less than or equal to the maximum expected payoﬀ to a
ring from a bid coordination mechanism.Q . E . D .
Proof of Proposition 8. Let r1 be the highest report and r2 the second-highest report
in the ring. Let v1 be the highest value and v2 the second-highest value in the ring.
Consider the following bidding rule: the center recommends that the ring member
with the highest report bid β
in(r1) and that all others bid v. Consider the following
payment rule: the bidder with the highest report pays the center ˆ p(r2), and all others
pay zero if their bid is v and ¯ v if their bid is greater than v. Suppose the bidders
join the ring and report truthfully. It is a best reply for bidders with less than the
highest value to bid v at the auction rather than bid anything else and pay ¯ v to
the center. Because the payment rule faced by the highest-valuing ring member is
constant with respect to his bid, the payment rule does not distort the highest-valuing
ring member’s choice of bid. Thus, in equilibrium the highest-valuing ring member
bids β
in(v1). Consider whether bidders report truthfully. If all other bidders report
truthfully and a bidder with value ˆ v<v 1 reports ˆ r>ˆ v, causing him to have the
highest report, i.e., ˆ v<v 1 < ˆ r, then his expected payoﬀ from participating in the
auction is p(ˆ v), but his payment to the center is ˆ p(v1) >p (ˆ v), giving him negative
expected payoﬀ.I fab i d d e rw i t hv a l u ev1 reports ˆ r<v 1, causing him not to have the
highest report, i.e., ˆ r<v 2 <v 1, then his expected payoﬀ from participating in the
auction is negative because the payment rule speciﬁes a payment of ¯ v, but if he reports
truthfully his expected payoﬀ from participating in the auction is positive. Because
all other deviations have zero expected payoﬀ, this establishes that no ring member
50has an incentive to misrepresent his value to the center. Given the conditions in the
Proposition, individual rationality, either interim or ex ante, is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. Using the assumption of symmetry,












ˆ p(x)k(k − 1)F
k−2(x)(1 − F(x))f(x)dx,
and












(n − k)F n−k−1(y)f(y)dy
−
R vi
v ˆ p(x)(k − 1)Fk−2(x)f(x)dx −
R vi
v (vi − β
nc(vi))(n − 1)Fn−2(x)f(x)dx.
The ex ante individual rationality constraint is
R ¯ v
v g(x | ˆ p)f(x)dx ≥ 0. Substituting in
v =0 , ¯ v =1 ,F(v)=v, f(v)=1 ,n=3 ,k=2 , and β
nc(v)=
(n−1)v
n , and calculating
β
out and β
in numerically (see Marshall et al. (1994)), we can calculate g numerically
as shown in Figure 1.





Graph of g(v | ˆ p) for n =3 , k =2 , and values drawn from U[0,1].
An additional numerical calculation gives
R 1
0 g(x | ˆ p)dx ≈ .017 > 0. (The code used
to calculate this result is available from the authors on request.) Thus, ex ante
individual rationality is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
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